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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
Collateral Estoppel: Defendant denied defensive use of collateral
estoppel despite having met a greater burden of proof on the issue of
contributory negligence as plaintiff in a prior action.
In Schwartz v. Public Administrator,113 the Court of Appeals set
out two requirements which must be met if the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is to be successfully invoked:
lAin identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the
prior action and is decisive of the present action, and.., a full and
fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling." 4
In Nesbitt v. Nimmich,11s the Court acknowledged the additional re-
quirement that the burden of proof met in establishing the issue in the
previous adjudication must have been at least as great as that faced by
the party claiming the estoppel in the present action. Nesbitt involved
adversaries who had been co-defendants in a prior negligence action
wherein the instant defendant had been found negligent and the in-
stant plaintiff had been exonerated. The instant plaintiff's attempt to
invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel on the issue of contributory
negligence failed, the Appellate Division reasoning that as a defendant
in the prior action he had met a lesser burden of proof on the issue of
his own negligence than he would have to meet as plaintiff.116
Recently, in Walsdorf v. Miller,"7 the Civil Court of the City of
New York, Queens County, was presented with a variation of the
Nesbitt situation. In a previous action by Miller against Walsdorf and
other defendants, Walsdorf had been exonerated but Miller had suc-
ceeded in recovering against another defendant. In the instant action
by Walsdorf against Miller, Miller attempted to plead collateral
estoppel, arguing that as a prevailing plaintiff in a prior action he had
proved his own freedom from contributory negligence. It should be
noted that Miller had met a greater burden as plaintiff in the prior
action than he would have to meet to escape liability as a defendant.
The Nesbitt case, where only a lesser burden had been previously met,
is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. Despite this difference, the court
11 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 NX.E2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 135, 144-51 (1969).
114 24 N.Y.2d at 71, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 960. For a discussion of the
expansion of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in New York which led up to this liberal
standard, see Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 165 (1969).
11530 N.Y.2d 622, 282 NX.E2d 328, 311 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1972), aff'g mem., 34 App. Div. 2d
958, 312 N.Y.S.2d 766 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST.
JOHN'S L. Rav. 500, 521 (1971).
116 34 App. Div. 2d at 959, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
117 73 Misc. 2d 221,342 N.Y.S.2d 381 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1973).
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held Nesbitt in point and refused to allow Miller to plead the estoppel.
The court tersely reasoned that "although the source of energy has
shifted, the principle of law has not.""18
The Nesbitt reasoning should apply only when the party claiming
the estoppel has shifted his position from defendant to plaintiff, thereby
incurring a greater burden of proof. Logic dictates that a party who
has successfully shown his own freedom from negligence by a clear
preponderance of the evidence should not be held liable subsequently
to one who had opposed him in the action wherein this showing was
made. When the "full and fair opportunity" and "identity of issue"
requirements enunciated in the Schwartz case have been met, a party
who has previously met a greater burden of proof than is required of
him in the instant action should have the benefit of collateral estoppel.
Apart from the issue of the changing burdens of proof, however,
there may be valid reasons why a party in the position of the defend-
ant in Walsdorf should be denied collateral estoppel. The Schwartz case
dictates that the factual issue as to which the estoppel is invoked must
necessarily have been determined in the prior action. If the prior deci-
sion could have rested on any of several possible factual findings, none
of these findings is deemed established for the purposes of collateral
estoppel. 119 An ordinary negligence action provides a simple illustra-
tion. Where A sues B in negligence and the jury returns a verdict for
B, neither B's freedom from negligence nor A's contributory negligence
has necessarily been determined because either alone would support
the verdict. In the case where A sues C and the jury returns a verdict
for A, both issues have necessarily been determined in A's favor. In
Walsdorf, these two hypotheticals are combined, A having sued both
B and C, prevailing against B but losing against C. A plausible argu-
ment can be made that the issue of A's contributory negligence was
necessarily decided only as between A and B. As a defendant, C had
the option of proving either A's contributory negligence or his own
freedom from negligence. He is entitled to rest his case on the latter
ground, leaving the question of contributory negligence to be litigated
between his co-defendant and the plaintiff. In many cases, it will be
unjust to bind C in a subsequent action by a factual determination
which, at the time it was made, was of importance only to A and B.
118 Id. at 223, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 382 (emphasis in original).
119 See Lewis v. Ocean Nay. & Pier Co., 125 N.Y. 341, 348, 26 N.E. 301, 303 (1891);
Purpora v. Coney Island Dairy Products Corp., 262 App. Div. 908, 28 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (2d
Dep't 1941); Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 165, 182
(1965).
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Since C was never required to address himself to the issue of A's negli-
gence, he may argue with considerable force that A's subsequent use
of collateral estoppel denies him a "full and fair opportunity to con-
test" the question.120
Dissimilarity of issues is another possible ground for denying
collateral estoppel in the Walsdorf case. Conceivably a party to an acci-
dent may be responsible for injuries to others without being negligent
with respect tq his own injuries. In such a case, he should recover as a
plaintiff but be held liable as a defendant. In many cases, of course,
the two issues will be indistinguishable.
These considerations illustrate the fallacy of applying mechanical
rules in determining the availability of collateral estoppel.121 Each
case must be examined individually on its facts to determine whether
the broad requirements set out in Schwartz and Nesbitt have been met.
Only a case by case approach will prevent inconsistent adjudications
while ensuring that a party is not denied his day in court.
ARTICLE 41 - TRiLu BY A JURY
CPLR 4110-b: New York adopts federal pre-charge conference pro-
cedure.
The newly added CPLR 4110-b 122 substantially adopts Rule 51 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It allows counsel at trial to sub-
mit written jury-charge requests at the close of the evidence or at such
earlier time as the court may request. The provision contemplates that
court and counsel will confer out of the hearing of the jury before the
closing arguments so that counsel can be informed of the charge to be
given. The new section further provides that the jury must be charged
after counsels' dosing arguments and that any objection forming the
basis for an assignment of error on appeal must be made before the
jury retires to deliberate. The new provision should benefit all con-
cerned. Counsels' written requests will assist the trial judge in prepar-
ing his charge by forewarning him of objections. Additionally, the
pre-charge conference will give attorneys an opportunity to structure
their summations around the charge.
120 Perhaps a party in C's position should be treated as a stranger to the A-B action.
Cf. Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N.Y. 159, 184 N.E. 744 (1933).
121 See Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 165, 195
(1969).
122 L. 1973, ch. 233, at 312, eff. Sept. 1, 1973.
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